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University Policy, Affirmative Action, and
the Principles of Justice
Eric Wampler
The position I take in this paper will be
that Affirmative Action policies in university
admissions are in accord with the principles of
justice. I am defending a strong form of
Affirmative Action: given that both applicants
are qualified to do the university course work
and to graduate in a reasonable amount of time,
a university acts justly in admitting a slightly less
qualified minority over a slightly more qualified
white.
One of the possible goals of Affirmative
Action includes compensation for past centuries
of injustice and injury. And while the
compensation argument might be a defensible
position and certainly appeals to our initial moral
intuitions, I will not focus on it. Instead, I will
focus on a forward-looking argument that strives
for a fair distribution of resources and for social
well-being; the ultimate end being a greater
egalitarian society.
My defense of Affirmative Action
contains two elements. First, I will argue that
the ends, or goal, of Affirmative Action are just.
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Second, I will argue that Affirmative Action
does not use unjust means to reach its ends. 1
Ends of Affirmative Action
To begin with, then, it may be helpful to
remember some facts that seem to suggest
strong inequities in this society. In a 1995
report, for example, while 42 percent of white
high school graduates, ages 18-24, attended
college, only 35.8 percent of Latinos and 32.8
percent of blacks likewise attended an institution
of higher education.2 In 1988, 34 percent poor
whites resided in the inner cities; this contrasts
with the 57 percent of poor blacks who lived in
the inner cities.3 The life expectancy of a black
baby born in 1990 is 6-8 years less than that of a
white baby. 4 The infant mortality among whites
is 7.5 per thousand live births; among blacks it is
over double that: 16.5 per thousand live births.s
Maternal mortality rates during child birth
among blacks are over three times that of
whites,6 and blacks have an approximately 16
percent less likelihood than whites of surviving
five years after diagnosed with cancer. 7 And
finally, while there are more whites than blacks
below the poverty line, 9.4 percent of white
families live below the poverty line compared
with 31.3 percent of black families. 8
Now since all of these things--making
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money, surviving illness, and having healthy
children--are things that most people desire,
regardless of gender or race, the fact that
minorities lack them to a greater proportional
extent than whites suggests that the current
system of resources, essential services, and
opportunities is consciously or unconsciously
unfair to minorities. In addition to this racial
inequality, there is out-and-out racism, which is
evident by the presence of hate crimes; high-
profile, substantiated charges of housing and job
discrimination; and sobering polls such as
following: according to a University of Chicago
General Social Survey, National Opinion Center
(1994), approximately 15 percent of Americans
answered 'yes' when asked if whites have a right
to keep black out of their neighborhoods.9 It
should be no surprise that the result of racial
inequality and racism10 is an exacerbation of
racial tensions which can further divide society:
Peter Singer notes that
...when these inequalities coincide
with an obvious difference between
people like the differences between
African Americans and Americans of
European descent, or between males
and females, they do more to produce
a divided society with a sense of
superiority on the one side and a sense
of inferiority on the other. Racial and
sexual inequality may therefore have a
more divisive effect than other forms
of inequality. 11
A policy, then, that ameliorates racial tensions
and helps bring about social harmony is a good
policy, all other things being equal.
Affirmative Action in university
admissions procedures tends to increase
qualified minority representation in professional
occupations like doctors, lawyers, and teachers.
And since professional occupations tend to
confer greater enjoyment of resources, this
procedure brings about a more equitable
distribution of resources. Also, as Singer points
out,
Minority and female doctors and
lawyers can serve as role models
to other members of minority groups,
and to women, breaking down the
unconscious mental barriers against
aspiring to such positions. 12
Singer goes on to suggest that having more
minority professionals would benefit more
minorities in general, as minorities proportionally
tend to provide more services for other
minorities in typically professional-under-
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represented areas. Also, having the universities
more closely represent the diverse real world
would better enable graduates to know the
concerns and expectations that can differ across
racial lines as well as differ widely within the
same racial group, which would benefit both
minorities and whites: according to Robert
Atwell, president of the American Council on
Education (representing 1,800 colleges and
universities):
The whole basis of affirmative action is
ro recognize that we need to make the
educated work force of this nation look
like America if we're to compete in this
world.13 [Note that Atwell's "whole
basis" is only one goal in this paper.]
If these factual claims are true, then, Affirmative
Action would represent a progression towards
racial equality concerning our society's
resources, which would help repair racial tension
and promote social harmony. And, so, all other
things being equal, Affirmative Action is a just
policy as its ends are the establishment of a
greater egalitarian society.
Means of Affirmative Action
It could be said, however, that I am
trying to have the ends justify the means, means
which are themselves unjust. Certainly any talk
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of ends will plant one squarely in the
consequentialist realm of moral justification but
what of the deontologist who claims that a
deontological requirement (e.g., along the lines
of, "One should not lie.") is being violated?
Always using equality in one's dealings with
others would be a vague formulation of the
requirement in question.14 But as we do not
treat the homeowner equally when he or she is
subject to eminent domain in order to construct
a direct road from the community to the
hospital--thus saving precious moments and
lives--sometimes unequal treatment is warranted
by a situation.15 But the deontological thrust of
the question remains: If the original actions of
discrimination were unjust, shouldn't actions of
reverse discrimination be unjust as well? To
answer this, since university positions are a
resource that should be divided up in a fair way,
we must look to distributive justice to aid us in
our mqUIry.
Distributive justice demands that we
observe the principle of equal consideration of
interests. This is a principle that says that we
must weigh exactly the same any two persons'
interests--or desires--regardless of whose
interests we are considering.16 If I come upon
the scene of an accident, for example, in which
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two people have sustained the same extent of
injuries, I cannot give my only shot of morphine
to one person simply because that person is
white or simply because that person is black. I
am obliged to weigh both of their interests
equally (and presumably, here, pick arbitrarily).
So in considering two applicants for one
university spot, both of their interests must have
the same weight. For example, while both of
our hypothetical applicants are qualified to
graduate from the university in a reasonable
period of time, one is a white applicant and on is
a slightly less qualified minority applicant. As
they both equally want the spot, I must make the
decision as to which to accept by using the
university's goals as the deciding criteria. Many
say that the university's goal here should be to
enroll the most qualified applicant possible. But
that only raises the question of why being the
most qualified is the only relevant characteristic
for our criteria. Edwin C. Hettinger presents
and examines three main reasons--efficiency,
desert, and rights--and offers explanations why
each is unsatisfactory in the context of the
Affirmative Action debate. 17
Concerning the first, efficiency, it would
seem that the university wants to take only the
most qualified applicants so as to create greater
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efficiency in society. We could rely on more
professionals being more qualified since the
universities themselves were taking only the
most qualified applicants possible.
But while many would take the promise
for the most possible efficiency as a self-
justifying virtue, in reality it is not at all clear
that efficiency is morally relevant here. One may
become more efficient if one learns to type
correctly rather than peck-type with two fingers,
but one is not morally obliged to learn the
correct way to type. IS Also, it is important to
remember, the minority applicant, as well as the
white applicant, must be deemed qualified to
graduate from the university in the first place.
So the type of Affirmative Action defended here
does not ask society to tolerate any more
unqualified professionals in the work place than
already surely existed with primarily white
professionals. And it also seems that the short-
term efficiency costs that Affirmative Action is
asking us to make are outweighed by the long-
term investment of increasing the talent pool by
increasing the proportions of currently under
represented minorities:
What sense does it make, particularly
with the globalization of markets and
services, to waste the potential of nearly
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2/3 of the national community? By
expanding the pool of candidates who
will become tomorrow's teachers,
scientists, and management executives,
we improve the quality of our products,
our services, and our leadership. 19
Concerning the second commonly-held
reason for a university to admit only the most
qualified--that of desert--many find it a truism
that by simply being the most qualified applicant,
one deserves the university spot. Again,
however, a closer examination reveals otherwise.
As Hettinger notes, most of the things that make
an applicant qualified are a function of the
following factors:
...(a) innate abilities, (b) home
environment, (c) socio-economic class
of parents, (d) quality of the schools
attended, (e) luck, and (f) effort or
perseverance. A person is only
responsible for the last factor on this list,
and hence one only deserves one's
qualifications to the extent that they are a
function of effort. 20
Hettinger foes on to point out that, in fact, many
minorities who are slightly less qualified in the
normal use of the word would be considered
more deservingly qualified due to effort alone,
since statistically they have more hurdles to pass
than whites do. But in any case, because so
much of one's qualifications depend on
circumstances beyond one's control, being more
qualified by the application process doesn't
make one deserve to be admitted over someone
else.
Finally, concerning the third comrnonly-
held reason why a university should admit only
the most qualified applicant--that of rights--it
would seem that the most qualified applicant has
a right to the university spot. 21 But, once again,
careful scrutiny indicates otherwise. To see
why, we have to remember the principle of equal
consideration of interests.
Can a white rejected by a university claim
that the university gave less weight to his or her
interests than to the minority applicant selected
instead? 0, because being slightly more
qualified than the minority candidate does not
make his or her interests weigh more heavily--we
must weigh both interests the same and not say
to the minority student, "Since you are slightly
less qualified, your interests in this regard are of
intrinsically less concern to us." So how does
the university pick which student it will admit?
As Singer notes, it does so by appealing to its
goals: " ...on matching the applicants against
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standards that the university draws up with
certain policies in mind."22 Some of a
university's goals may include advancing the
carious academic disciplines, providing qualified
citizens whose industry will benefit the state and
the nation at large, and providing for social well-
being.
Increasing the representation of
minorities as professionals is a specific goal the
university can adopt as well, designed for greater
social harmony. The interests of the slighted
white are not being weighted less than the
minority applicant--they are weighted exactly the
same.23 It is the social goals that determine
which candidate is picked. Social goals that
satisfy the interests of all of us in greater society,
seeking to provide more harmony and happiness
for all. The different treatment, then, of different
applicants is justified by these legitimate goals.
This is similar to preferring to five first aid to a
doctor injured in an accident even if he or she is
less injured than many others present--he or she
could then assist in helping those more injured,
in this way better facilitating the interests of all
involved.
In conclusion, then, since a university
might adopt Affirmative Action procedures to
bring about a more egalitarian society, and since
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they do not resort to unjust means, such as
violating someone's rights, to reach that goal,
Affirmative Action in university admissions are
in accord with the principles of justice.
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appears in: Myers, David G. Psychology.
4th ed. New York: Worth, 1995. p. 683, table.
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the following: (a) racial discrimination--treating
others differently because of their race, whether
from good intentions or ill, and whether the facts
support the reasons for the discrimination or not
(e.g, this paper outlines a program of
Affirmative Action that seeks to promote social
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good intentions and, Ihope, correct facts); (b)
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forcing blacks to sit at the back of the bus in an
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